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them if it is clear from those circumstances that there is a
stronger connection with some other country? Again the
court stressed the need for legal certainty counterbalanced
with some flexibility. Therefore it is always necessary to
determine the applicable law on the basis of the presumptions
and it is only where it is clear from the circumstances as a
whole that the contract is more closely connected with a
country other than that identified by applying the
presumptions,that the court may disregard the presumptions.
Rome I
Rome I has a new art 5 which deals with the presumption
where there is no choice in a contract for the carriage of
goods by sea and passengers. Recital 22 of Rome I gives
contracts for the carriage of goods the same definition as art
4(4) of the Rome Convention and therefore Interfrigo is
equally applicable to determine which contracts the
presumption applies to.Art 5(1) provides that the law of the
country of the habitual residence of the carrier shall be
applicable,provided that that is also the place of receipt or the
place of delivery or the habitual residence of the consignor.If
those conditions are not satisfied, the law of the country
where the parties agreed the goods would be delivered
applies. Pursuant to art 5(3) where it is clear from all the
circumstances of the case that the contract is manifestly more
closely connected with a country other than that indicated in
art 5(1), the law of that other country shall apply. This
wording is clearer than the wording in art 4(5) of the Rome
Convention and already seems to provide for the solution
which the ECJ reached on the final issue in Interfrigo.
Habitual residence is helpfully defined in art 19 of Rome
I.For a company it is the place of central administration (art
19(1)).Art 19(2) clarifies the position where the contract is
concluded in the course of operation of a branch,agency or
any other establishment.The relevant time for determining
the habitual residence is when the contract is concluded (art
19(3)).Recital 22 provides that the term ‘consignor’refers to
any person who enters into a contract of carriage.The term
‘carrier’ refers to the party who undertakes to carry the
goods, whether or not it performs the carriage itself ie the
contractual carrier and not the actual carrier.
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Review of the Brussels I Regulation
Almost four months after the deadline of 30 June 2009, preceding
which the European Commission launched a broad consultation
among interested parties on possible ways to improve the operation
of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters (OJ 2001 L 12/1), the member states of the European
Union await the results with baited breath.
After the comparative survey of the Regulation,which resulted
in the Heidelberg Report on the Application of Regulation
Brussels I in the member states (Hess, Pfeiffer, Schlosser, Study
JLS/C4/2005/03), the European Commission issued a Green
Paper on the review of the Regulation (COM (2009) 175 final,
Brussels,21 April 2009),accompanied by a Report on the same
Regulation’s application (COM (2009) 174 final, Brussels, 21
April 2009).The suggestions given in relation to the interface
between arbitration and the Regulation are particularly
important for the London market,given the recent decision of
the European Court of Justice in Allianz SpA (formerly Riunione
Adriatica di Sicurta SpA) v West Tankers Inc (C-185/07) [2009] 1
Lloyd’s Rep 413, where it was held that the use of an 
anti-suit injunction to restrain proceedings in the court of
another member state,even where those proceedings have been
commenced in breach of an arbitration agreement, isSHIPPING & TRADE LAW  . November 2009  . Review of the Brussels I Regulation
4
incompatible with the Regulation.This is so, even though
the Regulation explicitly excludes arbitration from its scope
in art 1(2)(d).
Extension of the Regulation to arbitration
Suggestions given in the Green Paper significantly include a
(partial) deletion of the exclusion of arbitration from the
scope of the Regulation.The extent of such a ‘partial’deletion
however is not explained any further. It is inconceivable that
the Commission continues to propose an extension of the
Regulation to arbitration,given the critical attitude of such a
move by the majority of stakeholders interviewed during the
Heidelberg Report. Practitioners of the London Bar in
particular,‘unanimously’ expressed that any extension of the
Regulation would be undesirable,as it would undermine the
proper functioning of the 1958 New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(1958 UKTS 20(1976), Cmnd 6419).
A deletion would result in all court proceedings in support
of arbitration falling under the Regulation’s regime, in
addition to those that come within the definition of
‘provisional measures’ by virtue of art 31. It is further
suggested that exclusive jurisdiction could be granted to the
courts of the member state of the place of arbitration.This
proposal however barely solves the current problem before
creating a new one.Where the place of arbitration has not
been determined prior to the dispute arising, and in the
likely event of the parties not reaching an agreement
afterwards,how is the arbitral seat to be decided? The Green
Paper incredibly proposes that the courts of the member state
which would have jurisdiction over the dispute under the
Regulation in the absence of an arbitration agreement
should be given such jurisdiction. Not only are there
numerous heads of jurisdiction that may be applicable, but a
lengthy trial would be needed to determine which rules are
to be used in each case. Further, where the main rule in 
art 2 is preferred, the defendant may gain an unfair
advantage,as most parties opt for a neutral seat and a neutral
choice of law.
In relation to recognition and enforcement of judgments,
in particular to those determining the validity of an
arbitration agreement, the Green Paper suggests that the
deletion of the arbitration exception would enforce
recognition of such judgments (note art 33 et seq) It is
submitted that this result may prevent parallel proceedings
between the courts of different member states,yet,as arbitral
tribunals do not come within the regime of the Regulation,
there is nothing preventing tribunals continuing in the face
of a negative judgment - an excellent example being 
CMA CGM SA v Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co Ltd [2008]
EWHC 2791 (Comm).
Determination of validity of arbitration agreements
It is proposed that priority should be given to the courts of the
Member State where the arbitration takes place to decide on
the existence, validity and scope of an arbitration agreement.
Once again problems arise if the seat of arbitration has not and
cannot be determined. If the ‘priority’ rule is one over the
courts of other member states,the merits of the proposal may
be accepted, yet, if the ‘court first seised rule’ in art 27
continues after the current revision of the Regulation, it is
hard to see how this will work in practice. Fundamentally
however, if the Green Paper is proposing that the courts have
priority over an arbitral tribunal to determine the validity of
an arbitration agreement, on the mere basis that a court
judgment must be recognised by other member states’ courts,
then the suggestion is completely flawed.This reading would
result in rendering ineffective an arbitration agreement as a
defence to judicial proceedings,essentially bestowing a ‘second
class status’ upon arbitration (See Merkin, ‘Anti-suit
injunctions: The future of anti-suit injunctions in Europe’,
ArbLM, 2009, Apr, 1-9). Furthermore, significant delay and
additional costs that may not be recoverable would be incurred
by the party forced to respond to the court proceedings,as well
as all confidentiality being lost.The proposal crucially ignores
the very much accepted principal of ‘competence-
competence’, which denotes that arbitrators are to determine
their own jurisdiction and does nothing to prevent the
likelihood of Regulation’s provisions being abused by tactical
litigants, for example, Turner v Grovit (C-159/02) [2004] 2
Lloyd’s Rep 169 and JP Morgan Europe Ltd v Primacom AG
[2005] EWHC 508 (Comm).That being said,unless the reach
of the Regulation is to become so extensive that it governs
arbitral tribunals also, as stated, the arbitral proceedings may
continue on regardless, although enforcement of an arbitral
award in a foreign state may prove difficult.
Quite sensibly, the Green Paper discusses refusal of
enforcement of judgments that are irreconcilable with arbitral
awards and exclusive competence being given to the courts of
a member state where the arbitral award was given to certify
the enforceability of the award as well as its procedural fairness,
after which the award would freely circulate in the
Community. Given the logical and what should be minimal
change these provisions would produce, it is hoped that they
are accepted by the Community.The suggestions close with a
more drastic proposal, permitted by art VII of the New York
Convention,of a separate Community instrument to facilitate
the recognition of arbitral awards.Such a drastic step is bound
to be criticised by the majority although it is the opinion of
this author that a European instrument regulating arbitration is
nothing more than inevitable.
The results of the consultation are unlikely to be surprising,
given the tendency for common law lawyers and those on theContinent to voice quite different views over a great many
things.The consequential revision of the Regulation however
is very likely to cause controversy,as whatever suggestions the
Commission adopts,it will be unable to please everyone.
Jennifer Lavelle,research assistant,
Institute of Maritime Law,University of Southampton
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Case update
Soufflet Negoce v Bunge SA
[2009] EWHC 2454 (Comm)
Readiness to load – GAFTA form 49 
clause 9 – Notice of Readiness (NOR)
The facts
The contract was for the sale of 15,000
tons of feed barley, FOB Nikotera,
Ukraine; delivery 9-22 October 2006 at
buyers’ call; weight and quantity to be
final as issued by a GAFTA approved
surveyor. Terms were provided as to
laytime, demurrage or despatch, with
laytime to commence upon issue of a
valid notice of readiness. The sale
contract also incorporated the GAFTA
form No 49.
At arbitration, the buyers had claimed
for damages for failure to load the cargo.
The NOR was tendered on the last day
of the delivery period, and a dispute
arose as to whether the holds were ready
to load the cargo.The sellers claimed the
holds were unclean thus not satisfying
the readiness requirement;but the buyers
argued otherwise, wanting the sellers to
load after 22 October.The buyers then
treated the sellers’refusal as a repudiatory
breach. This was an appeal from the
award made by the GAFTA Board.
The issue was whether the sellers were
obliged to complete loading after the
specified delivery period, and the trial
judge, Mr Justice David Steel, felt that it
depended on two pre-conditions: that
the vessel is presented at the loading port
within the delivery period ‘in readiness
to load’; and that loading has/should
have commenced during the delivery
period (at para 7).
The interpretation of cl 6 of the
GAFTA form, which provides that the
vessel should be at the load port ‘in
readiness to load’, was the cause of the
dispute.The sellers (appellants) were of
the view that cl 6 is satisfied if the vessel
was in such condition as would enable a
valid NOR to be issued under a voyage
charterparty. The buyers, on the other
hand, argued that the vessel only had to
be physically and legally capable of
loading the cargo.
The GAFTA Appeal Board had found
that the issue turned on whether a
requirement was imposed on the buyers
by cl 6 to present a vessel which was in
every sense ready to load the cargo, or
whether the buyers only had to present
the vessel for loading. The Board’s
finding was that the buyers only had to
present the vessel for loading and they
had complied on 22 October. They
reached this decision, taking into
account the fact that the claim was for
failure to load under a sale contract, not
for demurrage; and since the buyers had
purchased on FOB terms, their
responsibility was to present a vessel
within the delivery period which was
able to load, both physically and legally,
and that the sellers were obliged to load,
irrespective of any concerns they might
have.As risk passes from sellers to buyers
upon loading, the risk was the buyers’
not the sellers’, if the holds were not fit
to receive the goods. Only very clear
terms in the sale contract would suffice
to place a duty on the sellers to ensure
that the vessel was fit to receive the cargo
before loading.A joint inspection clause
was not sufficient, and such a right
would not have been beneficial to the
sellers as the contract included a
certificate final clause at the port of
loading,as to quality.
The buyers,not surprisingly,supported
the decision by the GAFTA Board.The
sellers disagreed, putting forward a
number of submissions.They argued that
where there is an express ‘readiness to
load’ clause,‘readiness’ is critical in order
to establish when the loading operation
is to start. They also argued that as
laytime and demurrage provisions were
included in the contract, this was
compelling reason to treat cl 6 ‘readiness’
the same way as that required by a
charterparty NOR.The sellers felt that
the express incorporation of the
charterparty terms into the sale contract
lent further weight to these submissions.
They submitted also, that buyers would
take advantage of this position by
presenting a vessel not fully ready to
load,so as to trigger the extension of the
delivery period, burdening sellers with
carrying charges.The sellers argued that
drawing a distinction between readiness
under a charterparty and under a sale
contract would lead to uncertainty and
confusion;that sellers do have an interest
in the condition of the holds, as there is
risk of delay especially if the buyers were
to take steps to render the holds fit;thus
making it necessary for buyers to give a
concurrent NOR.
The judgment
Steel J disagreed with the sellers’
contention that the Board were wrong
not to give any meaning to the phrase
‘readiness to load’, pointing out that the
Board had interpreted the phrase to
mean that it had to be ‘physically and
legally possible’for the sellers to load the
cargo.The Board had concluded that it
was both physically and legally possible
to load,and it did not matter whether or
not coal powder was present in the
holds, or whether or not it would have
prevented the shipowners from
tendering a valid NOR. Steel J felt that
the few possible physical or legal
restrictions would not have been
sufficient enough to lead to a different
conclusion.